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Aurangzeb and the decline of the Mughal empire,
Mughal architecture & literature - Part 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Akbar's son Jahangir ruled after him (1605-27), and his grandson Shah Jahan (1628-58) followed. Shah Jahan's son Aurangzeb (1658-1707) was the last significant ruler of the empire. His rule began well, and he brought the Muslim Deccan kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda under Mughal control. He was very intolerant of other religions, however, and persecuted the Hindus openly. This led to rebellions, and the cost of suppressing these rebellions emptied the imperial treasury. When he died, the rulers that followed could not successfully regain control of the land. During the reign of Muhammad Shah (1719-48) the empire began to shrink, and within a few years the Mughals ruled only Delhi and a small area around it. By 1803 the wily British had exploited the scene, and taken control. The last Mughal was Bahadur Shah II, whose reign began in 1837. He was finally ‘expelled’ from India for taking part in a mutiny against the British in 1857 known as the Sepoy Revolt (First War of Indian Independence).
2.0 Problems of Succession after Shah Jahan
The last years of Shah Jahan's reign were clouded by a bitter war of succession among his sons. There was no clear tradition of succession among the Timurids. The right of nomination by the ruler had been accepted by some of the Muslim political thinkers. But it could not be asserted in India during the Sultanate period. The Timurid tradition of partitioning had not been successful either and was never applied in India.
Hindu traditions were not very clear in the matter of succession either. According to Tulasidas, a contemporary of Akbar, a ruler had the right of giving the tika to any one of his sons. But there were many cases among the Rajputs where such a nomination had not been accepted by the other brothers. Thus, Rana Sanga had to wage a bitter struggle with his brothers before he could assert his claim to the throne.
Towards the end of 1657, Shah Jahan was taken ill at Delhi and for some time, his life was in mortal danger. But he rallied and gradually recovered his strength under the loving care of Dara (Shikoh). Meanwhile, all kinds of rumours had gained currency. It was said that Shah Jahan had already died, and Dara was concealing the reality to serve his own purposes. After some time, Shah Jahan slowly made his way to Agra. Meanwhile, the princes, Shuja in Bengal, Murad in Gujarat and Aurangzeb in the Deccan, had either been persuaded that these rumours were true, or pretended to believe them, and made preparations for the inevitable war of succession.
Anxious to avert a conflict between his sons, which might spell ruin to the Mughal Empire, and anticipating his speedy end, Shah Jahan now decided to nominate Dara as his successor (wali-ahd). He raised Dara's mansab from 40,000 zat to the unprecedented rank of 60,000. Dara was given a chair next to the throne and all the nobles were instructed to obey Dara as their future sovereign. But these actions, far from ensuring a smooth succession as Shah Jahan had hoped, convinced the other princes of Shah Jahan's partiality to Dara. It thus strengthened their resolve of making a bid for the throne.
There were many reasons for Aurangzeb's success. Divided counsel and under-estimation of opponents by Dara were two of the major factors responsible for Dara's defeat. On hearing of the military preparations of his sons and their decision to march on the capital, Shah Jahan had sent an army to the east led by Dara's son, Sulaiman Shikoh, and aided by Mirza Raja Jai Singh to deal with Shuja who had crowned himself. Another was sent to Malwa under Raja Jaswant Singh, the ruler of Jodhpur. On his arrival in Malwa, Jaswant found that he was faced with the combined forces of Aurangzeb and Murad. The two princes were intent on a conflict and invited by Jaswant to stand aside.
Jaswant could have retreated but deeming retreat to be a matter of dishonour, he decided to stand and fight, though the odds were definitely against him. The victory of Aurangzeb at Dharmat (15 April 1658) emboldened his supporters and raised his prestige, while it dispirited Dara and his supporters.
After Dharmat, Dara made frantic efforts to seek allies. He sent repeated letters to Jaswant Singh who had retired to Jodhpur. The Rana of Udaipur was also approached. Jaswant Singh moved out tardily to Pushkar near Ajmer. After raising an army with the money provided by Dara, he waited there for the Rana to join him. But the Rana had already been won over by Aurangzeb with a promise of a rank of 7000 and the return of the parganas seized by Shah Jahan and Dara from him in 1654 following a dispute over the re-fortification of Chittor. Aurangzeb also held out to the Rana a promise of religious reedom and favours equal to those of Rana Sanga. Thus, Dara failed to win over even the important Rajput rajas to his side.
The battle of Samugarh (29 May 1658) was basically a battle of good generalship, the two sides being almost equally matched in numbers about 50,000 to 60,000 on each side. In this field, Dara was no match for Aurangzeb. The Hada Rajputs and the Sayyids of Barha upon whom Dara largely depended could not make up for the weakness of the rest of the hastily recruited army. Aurangzeb's troops were battle hardened and well-led.
Aurangzeb had all along pretended that his only object of coming to Agra was to see his ailing father and to release him from the control of the "heretical" Dara. But the war between Aurangzeb and Dara was not between religious orthodoxy on the one hand, and liberalism on the other. Both Muslim and Hindu nobles were equally divided in their support to the two rivals. In this conflict, as in so many others, the attitude of the nobles depended upon their personal interests and their association with individual princes.
After the defeat and flight of Dara, Shah Jahan was besieged in the fort of Agra. Aurangzeb forced Shah Jahan into surrender by seizing the source of water supply to the fort. Shah Jahan was confined to the female apartments in the fort and strictly supervised though he was not ill-treated. There he lived for eight long years, lovingly nursed by his favourite daughter Jahanara, who voluntarily chose to live within the fort. She re-emerged into public life after Shah Jahan's death and was accorded great honour by Aurangzeb who restored her to the position of the first lady of the realm. He also raised her annual pension from twelve lakh rupees to seventeen lakhs.
According to the terms of Aurangzeb's agreement with Murad, the kingdom was to be partitioned between the two. But Aurangzeb had no intention of sharing the Empire. Hence, he treacherously imprisoned Murad and sent him to the Gwalior jail. He was killed two years later.
After losing the battle at Samugarh, Dara had fled to Lahore and was planning to retain control of its surrounding areas. But Aurangzeb soon arrived in the neighbourhood, leading a strong army. Dara's courage failed him; he abandoned Lahore without a fight and fled to Sindh. Thus, he virtually sealed his fate. Although the civil war dragged on for more than two years, its outcome was hardly in doubt. Dara's move from Sindh into Gujarat and then into Ajmer on an invitation from Jaswant Singh, the ruler of Marwar, and the subsequent treachery of the latter are well known. The battle of Doorai near Ajmer (March 1659) was the last major battle Dara fought against Aurangzeb. Dara might well have escaped into Iran, but he wanted to try his luck again in Afghanistan. On the way, in the Bolan Pass, a treacherous Afghan chief made him a prisoner and handed him over to his dreaded enemy.
A panel of jurists decreed that Dara could not be suffered to live "out of necessity to protect the faith and Holy law, and also for reasons of state (and) as a destroyer of the Public peace." This is typical of the manner in which Aurangzeb, used religion as a cloak for his political motives. Two years after Dara's execution, his son, Sulaiman Shikoh, who had sought shelter with the Toler of Garhwal was handed over by him to Aurangzeb on an imminent threat of invasion. He soon suffered the same fate as his father.
Earlier, Aurangzeb had defeated Shuja at Khajwah near Allahabad (December 1658). Further campaigning against him was entrusted to Mir Jumla who steadily exerted pressure till Shuja was hounded out of India into Arakan (April 1660). Soon afterwards, he and his family met a dishonourable death at the hands of the Arakanese on a charge of fomenting rebellion.
The civil war which kept the Empire distracted, for more than two years showed that neither nomination by the ruler, nor plans of division of the Empire were likely to be accepted by the contenders for the throne. Military force became the only arbiter for succession and the civil wars became steadily more destructive. After being seated securely on the throne, Aurangzeb tried to mitigate, to some extent, the effects of the harsh Mughal custom of war unto death, between brothers. At the instance of Jahanara Begum, Sipihr Shikoh, son of Dara, was released from prison in 1673, given a mansab and married to a daughter of Aurangzeb. Murad's son, Izzat Bakhsh, was also released, given a mansab and married to another daughter of Aurangzeb. Earlier, in 1669, Dara's daughter, Jani Begum, who had been looked after by Jahanara as her own daughter,was married to Aurangzeb's third son, Muhammad Azam. There were many other marriages between Aurangzeb's family and the children and grandchildren of his defeated brothers. Thus, in the third generation, the families of Aurangzeb and his defeated brothers became one.
3.0 Aurangzeb's Reign - His Religious Policy
Aurangzeb ruled for almost 50 years. During his long reign, the Mughal Empire reached its territorial climax. At its height, it stretched from Kashmir in the north to Jinji in the south, and from the Hindukush in the west to Chittagong in the east. Aurangzeb proved to be a hardworking ruler, and never spared himself or his subordinates in the tasks of government. His letters show the close attention he paid to all affairs of state. He was a strict disciplinarian who did not spare his own sons. In 1686, he imprisoned prince Muazzam on a charge of intriguing with the ruler of Golconda, and kept him in prison for 12 long years. His other sons also had to face his wrath on various occasions. Such was the awe of Aurangzeb that even late in his life, when Muazzam was governor of Kabul, he trembled every time he received a letter from his father who was then in south India. Unlike his predecessors Aurangzeb did not like ostentation. His personal life was marked by simplicity. He had the reputation of being an orthodox, God-fearing Muslim. In course of time, he began to be regarded as a zinda pir, or "a living saint". While that may have suited a section of his subjects, the Hindu subjects might have found it quite funny and outrageous!
Historians are, however, deeply divided about Aurangzeb's achievements as a ruler. According to some, he reversed Akbar's policy of religious toleration and thus undermined the loyalty of the Hindus to the Empire. According to them, this, in turn, led to popular uprisings which sapped the vitality of the Empire. His suspicious nature added to his problems so that in the words of Khafi Khan, "all his enterprises were long drawn out" and ended in failure. Some other historians think that Aurangzeb has been unjustly maligned, that the Hindus had become disloyal due to the laxity of Aurangzeb's predecessors, so that Aurangzeb had no option but to adopt harsh methods and to try to rally to Muslims on whose support in the long run the Empire had to rest. A new trend has, however, emerged in the recent writings on Aurangzeb and efforts have been made to assess Aurangzeb's political and religious policies in the context of social, economic and institutional developments. There is little doubt about his being orthodox in his beliefs. He was not interested in philosophical debates or in mysticism though he did occasionally visit Sufi saints for their blessings, and did not debar his sons from dabbling in Sufism. While taking his stand on the Hanafi school of Muslim law which had been traditionally followed in India, Aurangzeb did not hesitate in issuing secular decrees, called zawabit. A compendium of his decrees has been collected in a work called Zawabit-i-Alamgiri. Theoretically, the zawabits supplemented the sharia. In practice, however, they often modified the sharia, in view of the conditions obtaining in India which were not provided for in the sharia.
Thus, apart from being an orthodox Muslim, Aurangzeb was also a ruler. He could hardly forget the political reality that the overwhelming population of India was Hindu; and that they were deeply attached to their faith. Any policy which meant the complete alienation of the Hindus and of the powerful Hindu rajas and zamindars was obviously unworkable.
In analysing Aurangzeb's religious policy, we may take note first of what have been called moral and religious regulations. At the beginning of his reign, he forbade the kalma being inscribed on coins lest a coin be trampled underfoot or be defiled while passing from hand to hand. He discontinued the festival of Nauroz (Navroz) as it was considered a Zoroastrian practice favoured by the Safavid rulers of Iran. Muhtasibs were appointed in all the provinces. These officials were asked to see that people lived their lives in accordance with the sharia. Thus, it was the business of these officials to see that wine and intoxicants such as bhang were not consumed in public places. They were also responsible for regulating the houses of ill-repute, gambling dens, etc. and for checking weights and measures. In other words, they were responsible for ensuring that things forbidden by the zawabits (secular decrees) were, as far as possible, not flouted openly.
In appointing muhtasibs, Aurangzeb emphasised that the state was also responsible for the moral welfare of the citizens. But these officials were, instructed not to interfere in the private lives of citizens.
Later, in the eleventh year of his reign (1669) Aurangzeb took a number of measures which have been called puritanical, but many of which were really of an economic and social character, and against superstitious beliefs. Thus, he forbade singing in the court and the official musicians were pensioned off.
Instrumental music and naubat (the royal band) were, however, continued. Singing also continued to be patronized by the ladies in the harem, and by individual nobles. It is of some interest to note, as has been mentioned before, that the largest number of Persian works on classical Indian music were written in Aurangzeb's reign and that Aurangzeb himself was proficient in playing the veena.
Aurangzeb discontinued the practice of jharoka darshan or showing himself to the public from the balcony since he considered it a superstitious practice and against Islam. Similarly, he forbade the ceremony of weighing the emperor against gold and silver and other articles on his birthdays. This practice which was apparently started during Akbar's reign had become widespread and was a burden on the smaller nobles. But the weight of social opinion was too much. Aurangzeb had to permit this ceremony for his sons when they recovered from illness. He forbade astrologers to prepare almanacs. But the order was flouted by everybody including members of the royal family.
Many other regulations of a similar nature, some of a moral character and some to instill a sense of austerity, were issued. The throne room was to be furnished in a cheap and simple style; clerks were to use porcelain ink-stands instead of silver ones; silk clothes were frowned upon, the gold railings in the diwan-i-aam were replaced by those of lapis lazuli set on gold. Even the official department of history-writing was discontinued as a measure of economy. [lapis lazuli is a deep blue semi-precious stone]
To promote trade among the Muslims who depended almost exclusively on state support, Aurangzeb at first largely exempted Muslim traders from the payment of cess. But he soon found that the Muslim traders were abusing it, even passing off the goods of Hindu merchants as their own to cheat the state. So Aurangzeb re-imposed the cess on Muslim traders, but kept it at half of what was charged from others.
Similarly, he tried to reserve the posts of peshkars and karoris (petty revenue officials) for Muslims but soon had to modify it in the face of opposition from the nobles and lack of qualified Muslims. We may now turn our attention to some of the other measures of Aurangzeb which may be called discriminatory and show a sense of bigotry towards people professing other religions. The most important was Aurangzeb's attitude towards temples, and the levying of jizyah (jaziya) tax.
At the outset of his reign, Aurangzeb reiterated the position of the sharia regarding temples, synagogues, churches, etc., that "long standing temple should not be demolished but no new temples allowed to be built." Further, old places of worship could be repaired "since buildings cannot last forever". This position is clearly spelt out in a number of extant farmans he issued to the brahmanas of Banaras, Vrindavan, etc.
Auganzeb’s order regarding temples was not a new one. It reaffirmed the position which had existed during the Sultanate period and which had been reiterated by Shah Jahan early in his reign. In practice, it left wide a latitude to the local officials as to the interpretation of the words "long standing temples". The private opinion and sentiment of the ruler in the matter was also bound to weigh with the officials. For example, after the rise of the liberal-minded Dara as Shab Jahan's favourite, few temples had been demolished in pursuance of his order regarding temples. Aurangzeb, as govenor of Gujarat, ordered a number of temples in Gujarat to be destroyed, which often meant merely breaking the images and closing down the temples. At the outset of his reign, Aurangzeb found that images in these temples had been restored and idol worship had been resumed. Aurangzeb, therefore, ordered again in 1665 that these temples be destroyed. The famous temple of Somnath which he ordered to be destroyed earlier in his reign was apparently one of the temples mentioned above.
However, it does not seem that Aurangzeb's order regarding ban on new temples led to a large-scale destruction of temples at the outset of the reign. As Aurangzeb encountered political opposition from a number of quarters, such as the Marathas, Jats, etc., he seems to have adopted a new stance. In case of conflict with local elements, he now considered it legitimate to destroy even long standing Hindu temples as a measure of punishment and as a warning. Further, he began to look upon temples as centres of spreading subversive ideas, that is, ideas which were not acceptable to the orthodox elements. Thus, he took strict action when he learnt in 1669 that in some of the temples in Thatta, Multan and especially at Banaras, both Hindus and Muslims used to come from great distances to learn from the brahmanas.
Aurangzeb issued orders to the governors of all provinces to put down such practices and to destroy the temples where such practices took place. As a result of these orders, a number of temples such as the famous temple of Vishwanath at Banaras and the temple of Keshava Rai at Mathura built by Vir Singh Deo Bundela in the reign of Jahangir were destroyed and mosques erected in their place. The destruction of these temples had a political motive as well. Mustaid Khan author of the Maasir-i-Alamgiri says, with reference to the destruction of the temple of Keshava Rai at Mathura, "On seeing this instance of the strength of the Emperor's faith and the grandeur of his devotion to God, the proud rajas were stifled, and in amazement they stood like images facing the wall".
It was in this context that many temples built in Orissa during the last ten to twelve years were also destroyed. But it is wrong to think that there were any orders for the general destruction of temples. However, the situation was different during periods of hostilities. Thus, during 1679-80 when there was a state of war with the Rathors of Marwar and the Rana of Udaipur, many temples of old standing were destroyed at Jodhpur and its parganas, and at Udaipur.
In his policy toward temples, Aurangzeb may have remained formally with in the framework of the sharia, but there is little doubt that his stand in the matter was a setback to the policy of broad toleration followed by his predecessors. It led to a climate of opinion that destruction of temples on any excuse would not only be condoned but would be welcomed by the emperor. While we do have instances of grants to Hindu temples and mathas by Aurangzeb, on the whole, the atmosphere generated by Aurangzeb's policy towards Hindu temples was bound to create disquiet among large sections of Hindus. However, it seems that Aurangzeb's zeal for the destruction of temples abated after 1679, for we do not hear of any large-scale destruction of temples in the south between 1681 and his death in 1707. But a new irritant, the jizyah or the poll tax, was introduced in the interval.
According to the sharia, in a Muslim state, the payment of jizyah was obligatory (wajib) for the non-Muslims. Akbar had abolished it. However, a section of orthodox theologians had been agitating for the revival of jizyah, so that the superior position of Islam, including the theologians, could be made manifest to all. We are told that after accession to the throne, Aurangzeb contemplated revival of the jizyah on a number of occasions but did not do so for fear of political opposition. Ultimately, in 1679, in the twenty second year of his reign, he finally re-imposed it. There has been a considerable discussion among historians regarding Aurangzeb's motives for the step. It was not meant to be an economic pressure for forcing the Hindus to convert to Islam for its incidence was too light - women, children, the disabled and the indigent, that is those whose income was less than the means of subsistence were exempted, as were those in government service. Nor, in fact, did any significant section of Hindus change their religion due to this tax. Also, it was not a means of meeting a difficult financial situation. Although the income from jizyah is said to have been considerable, Aurangzeb sacrificed a considerable sum of money by giving up a large number of cesses called abwabs which were not sanctioned by the sharia and were hence considered illegal.
The imposition of jizyah was, in fact, both political and ideological in nature. It was meant to help only the Muslims for the defence of the state against the Marathas and the Rajputs who were up in arms; and possibly against the Muslim states of the Deccan, especially Golconda which was in alliance with the ‘infidels’. Secondly, jizyah was to be collected by honest, God-fearing Muslims, who were especially appointed for the purpose, and its proceeds were reserved for the ulema. It was thus a big bribe for the theologians among whom there was a lot of unemployment. But the disadvantages outweighed the possible advantages of the step. It was bitterly resented by the Hindus who considered it as a mark of discrimination. Its mode of collection also had some special features. The payee was required to pay it personally and sometimes he suffered humiliation at the hands of the theologians in the process. Since in the rural areas jizyah was collected along with the land revenue, well-to-do Hindus in the cities were affected more by these Practices.
We, therefore, hear of a number of occasions when Hindu traders shut their shops and observed hartal against the measure. Also, there was a lot of corruption, and in a number of instances, the amin or collector of jizyah was killed. But Aurangzeb was unrelenting, and was reluctant to grant exemption for payment of jizyah to the peasants; even when remission in land revenue bad to be given on account of natural calamities. Finally, he had to suspend jizyah in 1705 "for the duration of the war in the south" (for which no end was insight). This could hardly influence his negotiations with the Marathas, but gradually fell into disuse, all over the country. It was formally abolished in 1712.
Some modern writers are of the opinion that Aurangzeb's measures were designed to convert India from a dar-ul-harb, or a land of infidels, into dar-ul-Islam or a land inhabited by Muslims. Although Aurangzeb considered it legitimate to encourage conversion to Islam, evidence of systematic or large-scale attempts at forced conversion is lacking. Nor were Hindus in the nobles discriminated against. A recent study has shown that the number of Hindus in the nobility during the second half of Aurangzeb's reign steadily increased; till the Hindus including Marathas formed about one-third of the nobility as against one-fourth under Shah Jahan. On one occasion, Aurangzeb wrote on a petition in which, a post was claimed on religious grounds "what connection and what right have worldly affairs with religion? And what right have matters of religion to enter into bigotry? For you is your religion, for me is mine. If this rule (suggested by you) were established it would be my duty to extirpate all (Hindu) rajas and their followers."
Thus, Aurangzeb did not try to change the nature of the state, but re-asserted its fundamentally Islamic character. While an orthodox Muslim and desirous of upholding the strict letter of the law, as a ruler he was keen to strengthen and expand the Empire. Hence, he did not want to lose the support of the Hindus to the extent possible. However, his religious ideas and beliefs on the one hand, and his political or public policies on the other, clashed on many occasions and Aurangzeb was faced with difficult choices. Sometimes this led him to adopt contradictory policies which harmed the Empire.
4.0 Aurangzeb and the Deccani States (1658-87)
It is possible to trace three phases in the relations of Aurangzeb with the Deccani states. The first phase lasted till 1668 during which the main attempt was to recover from Bijapur the territories belonging to the Ahmadnagar state surrendered to it by the treaty of 1636; the second phase lasted till 1684 during which the major danger in the Deccan was considered to be the Marathas, and efforts were made to pressurize Bijapur and Golconda into joining hands with the Mughals against the great Maratha leader Shivaji Bhonsle and then against his son, Sambhaji. Simultaneously, the Mughals nibbled at the territories of the Deccani states which they tried to bring under their complete domination and control. The last phase began when Aurangzeb despaired of getting the cooperation of Bijapur and Golconda against the Marathas and decided that to destroy the Marathas it was necessary first to conquer Bijapur and Golconda.
The treaty of 1636, by which Shah Jahan had given one-third of the territories of Ahmadnagar state as a bribe for withdrawing support to the Marathas, and promised that the Mughals would "never never" conquer Bijapur and Golconda, had been abandoned by Shah Jahan himself. In 1657-58, Golconda and Bijapur were threatened with extinction. Golconda had to pay a huge indemnity, and Bijapur had to agree to the surrender of the Nizam Shahi territories granted to it in 1636.
The "justification" for this was that both these states had made extensive conquests in Karnataka and that "compensation" was due to the Mughals on the ground that the two states were Mughal vassals, and that their conquests had been made possible due to benevolent neutrality on the part of the Mughals. In reality the cost of maintaining the Mughal armies in thee Deccan was high, and the income from the Deccani areas under the control of the Mughals was insufficient to meet it. For a long time, the cost was met by subsidies from the treasuries of Malwa and Gujarat.
The resumption of a policy of limited advance in the Deccan had far-reaching implications which, it seems, neither Shah Jahan nor Aurangzeb adequately appreciated. It destroyed for all times confidence in the Mughal treaties and promises, and made impossible "a union of hearts" against the Marathas - a policy which Aurangzeb pursued with great perseverance for a quarter of a century but with little success.
The First Phase (1658-68): On coming to the throne, Aurangzeb had two problems in the Deccan, the problem posed by the rising power of Shivaji, and the problem of persuading Bijapur to part with the territories ceded to it by the treaty of 1636. Kalyani and Bidar had been secured in 1657. Parenda was secured by bribe in 1660. Sholapur still remained. After his accession, Aurangzeb asked Jai Singh to punish both Shivaji and Adil Shah. This shows Aurangzeb's confidence in the superiority of the Mughal arms and the underestimation of his opponents. But Jai Singh was an astute politician. He told Aurangzeb, "It would be unwise to attack both these fools at the same time."
However, Jai Singh was the only Mughal politician who advocated an all-out forward policy in the Deccan during this period. Jai Singh was of the opinion that the Maratha problem could not be solved without a forward policy in the Deccan - a conclusion to which Aurangzeb finally came 20 years later.
While planning his invasion of Bijapur, Jai Singh had written to Aurangzeb, "The conquest of Bijapur is the preface to the conquest of all Deccan and Karnataka." But Aurangzeb shrank from this bold policy. We can only guess at the reasons, the ruler of Iran had adopted a threatening attitude in the north-west; the campaign for the conquest of the Deccan would be long and arduous and would need the presence of the emperor himself for large armies could not be left in charge of a noble or an ambitious prince, as Shah Jahan had discovered to his misfortune! Also as long as Shah Jahan was alive, how could Aurangzeb afford to go away on a distant campaign?
With his limited resources, Jai Singh's Bijapur campaign (1665) was bound to fail. The campaign recreated the united front of the Deccani states against the Mughals, for Qutb Shah sent a large force to aid Bijapur. The Deccanis adopted guerilla tactics, driving Jai Singh on to Bijapur while devastating the countryside so that the Mughals could get no supplies. Jai Singh found that he had no means to assault the city since he had not brought siege guns, and to invest the city was impossible. The retreat proved costly, and neither money nor any additional territory was gained by Jai Singh by this compaign. This disappointment and the censures of Aurangzeb hastened Jai Singh's death (1667). The following year (1668), the Mughals secured the surrender of Sholapur by bribery. The first phase was thus over.
The Second Phase (1668-84): The Mughals virtually marked time in the Deccan between 1668 and 1676. A new factor during the period was the rise to power of Madanna and Akhanna in Golconda. These two gifted brothers virtually ruled Golconda from 1672 almost till the extinction of the state in 1687. The brothers followed a policy of trying to establish a tripartite alliance between Golconda, Bijapur and Shivaji. This policy was periodically disturbed by faction fights at the Bijapur court, and by the overweening ambition of the talented and shrewd Shivaji. The fictions at Bijapur could not be depended upon to follow a consistent policy. They adopted a pro or anti-Mughal stance depending upon their immediate interests. Shivaji looted and alternately supported Bijapur against the Mughals. Although seriously concerned at the growing Maratha power, Aurangzeb, it seems was keen to limit Mughal expansion in the Deccan. Hence, repeated efforts were made to instal and back a party at Bijapur which would cooperate with the Mughals against Shivaji and which would not be led by Golconda.
In pursuit of this policy, a series of Mughal interventions were made, the details of which are unnecessary for us.
The only result of Mughal diplomatic and military efforts was the re-assertion of the united front of the three Deccani powers against the Mughals. A last desperate effort of Diler Khan the Mughal Viceroy, to capture Bijapur in 1679-80 also failed, largely because no Mughal viceroy had the means to contend against the united forces of the Deccani states. A new element which was brought into play was the Karnataki foot soldiers. Thirty thousand of them sent by the Berar chief, Prem Naik, were a major factors in withstanding the Mughal siege of Bijapur. Shivaji, too, sent a large force to relieve Bijapur and raided the Mughal dominions in all directions. Thus, Diler Khan could achieve nothing except laying Mughal territories open to Maratha raids and he was recalled by Aurangzeb.
The Third Phase (1684-87): Thus, the Mughals achieved little during 1676-80, when Aurangzeb reached the Deccan in 1681 in pursuit of his rebel son, prince Akbar. At first, he concentrated his forces against Sambhaji, the son and successor of Shivaji while making renewed efforts to detach Bijapur, and Golconda from the side of the Marathas. His efforts did not have an outcome different from that of the earlier efforts. The Marathas were the only shield against the Mughals, and the Deccani states were not prepared to throw it away.
Aurangzeb now decided to force the issue. He called upon the Adil Shah as a vassal to supply provisions to the imperial army, to allow the Mughal armies free passage through his territory and to supply a contingent of 5000 to 6000 cavalry for the war against the Marathas. He also demanded that Sharza Khan, the leading Bijapuri noble opposed to the Mughals, be expelled. An open rupture was now inevitable. Adil Shah appealed for help both to Golconda and Sambhaji, which was promptly given. However, even the combined forces of the Deccani states could not withstand the full strength of the Mughal army, particularly when it was commanded by the Mughal emperor himself. Even then, it took 18 months of siege, with Aurangzeb being personally present during the final stages, before Bijapur fell (1686). This provides an ample justification for the earlier failure of Jai Singh (1665), and Diler Khan (1679-80).
A campaign against Golconda was inevitable following the downfall of Bijapur. The "sins" of the Qutb Shah were too many to be pardoned. He had given supreme power to the infidels, Madanna and Akhanna, and helped Shivaji on various occasions. His latest "treachery" was sending 40,000 men to aid Bijapur, despite Aurangzeb's warnings. In 1685, despite stiff resistance, the Mughals had occupied Golconda. The emperor had agreed to pardon the Qutb Shah in return for a huge subsidy, the ceding of some areas and the ousting of Madanna and Akhanna. The Qutb Shah had agreed and Madanna and Akhanna were dragged out into the streets and murdered (1686). But even this crime failed to save the Qutb Shahi monarchy. After the fall of Bijapur, Aurangzeb decided to settle scores with the Qutb Shah. The siege opened early in 1687 and after more than six months of campaigning the fort fell on account of treachery and bribery.
Aurangzeb had triumphed but he soon found that the extinction of Bijapur and Golconda was only the beginning of his difficulties. The last and the most difficult phase of Aurangzeb's life began now.
5.0 Aurangzeb, the Marathas and the Deccan - the Last Phase (1687-1707)
After the downfall of Bijapur and Golconda, Aurangzeb was able to concentrate all his forces against the Marathas, his consistent headache!
In 1689, Sambhaji (the son of Shivaji) was surprised at his secret hide-out at Sangameshwar by a Mughal force. He was paraded before Aurangzeb and executed brutally as a rebel and an infidel. This was undoubtedly another major political mistake on the part of Aurangzeb. He could have set a seal on his conquest of Bijapur and Golconda by coming to terms with the Marathas. By executing Sambhaji brutally, he not only threw away this chance, but provided the Marathas a cause (as they were now very upset). In the absence of a single rallying point, the Maratha sardars were left free to plunder the Mughal territories, disappearing at the approach of the Mughal forces.
Instead of destroying the Marathas, Aurangzeb made the Maratha opposition all-pervasive in the Deccan. Rajaram, the younger brother of Sambhaji was crowned as king, but had to escape when the Mughals attacked his capital. Rajaram sought shelter at Jinji on the east coast and continued the fight against the Mughals from there. Thus, Maratha resistance spread from the west to the east coast.
However, for the moment, Aurangzeb was at the height of his power, having triumphed over all his enemies. Some of the nobles were of the opinion that Aurangzeb should return to north India, leaving to others the task of mopping-up operations against the Marathas. Earlier there was an opinion which, it appears, had the support of the heir-apparent, Shah Alam, that the task of ruling over Karnataka should be left to the vassal rulers of Bijapur and Golconda. Aurangzeb rejected all these suggestions and imprisoned Shah Alam for daring to negotiate with the Deccani rulers. Convinced that the Maratha power had been crushed after 1690, Aurangzeb, concentrated on annexing to the Empire the rich and extensive Karnataka tract. However, Aurangzeb bit off more than he could chew. He unduly extended his lines of communications which became vulnerable to Maratha attacks, and neglected the task of providing a sound administration to the settled areas of Bijapur and Golconda. We should remember that this was the age of no-telephones, no-internet, no-computers, and no-automobiles!
During the period between 1690 and 1703, Aurangzeb stubbornly refused to negotiate with the Marathas. Rajaram was besieged at Jinji, but the siege proved to be long drawn out. Jinji fell in 1698, but the chief prize, Rajaram, escaped (just like his father Shivaji always used to!). Maratha resistance grew and the Mughals suffered a number of serious reverses. The Marathas recaptured many of their forts and Rajaram was able to come back to Satara. Undaunted, Aurangzeb set out to win back all the Maratha forts. For five and half years, from 1700 to 1705, Aurangzeb dragged his weary and ailing body from the siege of one fort to another. It is said that while Shivaji was alive, Aurangzeb would often get nightmares that would wake him up in sweat and cries. The same nightmares were playing themselves out in real life, it now seemed. Floods, disease and the Maratha roving bands took a fearful toll of the Mughal army. Weariness and disaffection steadily grew among the nobles and the army. Demoralization set in and many jagirdars made secret pacts with the Marathas and agreed to pay chauth if the Marathas did not disturb their jagirs. This was a huge success for the Marathas.
In 1703, Aurangzeb opened negotiations with the Marathas. He was prepared to release Shahu, the son of Sambhaji, who had been captured at Satara along with his mother. Shahu had been treated well. He had been given the title of raja and the mansab of 7000/7000. On coming of age he had been married to two Maratha girls of respectable families. Aurangzeb was prepared to grant Shahu Shivaji's swarajya and the right of sardeshmukhi over the Deccan, thus recognising his special positions. Over 70 Maratha sardars actually assembled to receive Shahu. But Aurangzeb cancelled the arrangements at the last minute uncertain about the intentions of the Marathas. His inner fears were raging.
By 1706, Aurangzeb was convinced of the futility of his effort to capture all the Maratha forts. He slowly retreated to Aurangabad while an exulting Maratha army hovered around and attacked the stragglers. Thus, when Aurangzeb breathed his last at Aurangabad in 1707, he left behind an Empire which was sorely distracted, and in which all the various internal problems of the Empire were coming to a head. The biggest credit to the fall of Aurangzeb, and the Mughals ultimately, thus, goes to the unrelenting Marathas, whose glorious legacy was started many decades ago by a young boy of 14 years - Shivaji Maharaj.
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