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The importance of Kailash Range
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- History: The Kailash Range was the theatre of conflict during the 1962 Chinese offensive, with key battles at Rezang La and Gurung Hill. In 2020, Indian troops secured Kailash Ridge in an operation that took the Chinese by surprise. Then came news of vacating it, in Feb second half.
- What happened in 1962: It was in early October 1962 that Chairman Mao Zedong decided to launch a large-scale invasion to severely punish India. While the main offensive was to be in the Eastern Sector, coordinated operations in the Western Sector were to be undertaken to capture areas up to the 1960 Claim Line in eastern Ladakh, which entailed elimination of 43 Indian posts.
- Gaining control over entire Aksai Chin was essential to guarantee security of the Western Highway, linking Kashgarh in Xinjiang to Lhasa in Tibet. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) offensive began on October 20, 1962, simultaneously in the Eastern and Western Sectors.
- The operations in Aksai Chin were executed in two phases. During Phase One (October 20-28, 1962) PLA went on to clear Indian posts at Daulat Beg Oldie, Galwan, astride both banks of Pangong Tso and Dungti-Demchok areas. Phase Two was launched after a tactical pause of three weeks on November 18, 1962 to capture the strategically important Kailash Range.
- The Karakoram Range ends on the northern side of the Pangong Tso. The Kailash Range originates from the southern bank and runs northwest to southeast for over 60 km. The Kailash Ridge is characterised by rugged, broken terrain with heights varying between 4,000-5,500m, and its key features include Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, Spanggur Gap, Muggar Hill, Mukhpari, Rezang La and Rechin La. The Ridge dominates Chushul Bowl; an important communications centre.
- The lull following Phase One was utilised by the Indian Army to reorganise its defences. The 3 Infantry Division was raised at Leh on October 26, 1962 under Major General Budh Singh. The HQ of 114 Infantry Brigade was moved to Chushul, the 70 Infantry Brigade took over the responsibility of Indus Valley Sub Sector, and the I63 Infantry Brigade was inducted for the Defence of Leh.
- Deployment at Chushul: The 114 Infantry Brigade responsible for Chushul area was holding a frontage of around 40 km.
- The plan duly approved by the Central Military Commission (CMC) envisaged capturing both Rezang La and Gurung Hill simultaneously. Troops comprising three battalions of the PLA’s 4 Infantry Division along with supporting units were concentrated in Retuzong area, about 40 km from the border. All these units had been in action during Phase One as well. As per instructions from the CMC, operations were to be confined to the positions on the ridge line only.
- Battle of Rezang La: The C Company of 13 Kumaon, responsible for the defence of Rezang La, was deployed two platoons up (Strong Points 7&9 ) with a third platoon and Company HQ on Point 5150 (Strong Point 8) in the centre. Besides, there were supporting detachments of 3-inch mortars, heavy machine guns and rocket launchers. The Chinese, having carried out detailed reconnaissance of Rezang La, planned to outflank the position at night and attack simultaneously from the northern and southern directions at first light. The attacking troops were divided into two task forces. One task force, composed of 3rd Battalion less company of 11th Regiment, was to attack Strong Point 9 from the south. The second task force, composed of two companies (one each from the 3rd Battalions of 10th & 11th Regiments), was to attack Strong Point 8 from the North. The 3rd Battalion less company ex-10th Regiment, and 3rd Cavalry less two companies, were to act as reserves.
- The attack: Following brief artillery bombardment, the attack commenced from both directions at 9:15 am. A fierce battle ensued, with the defender beating back successive Chinese attacks. With communication snapped and the position encircled, leaving no possibility of the C Company being reinforced, it was a “do and die” situation. Major Shaitan Singh, the Company Commander, even launched a local counterattack. Finally, by employing reserves, the Chinese did manage to break through and Rezang La fell by 10 pm November 18. It was an epic battle, literally fought to the “last man, last round”. Of the total 141 personnel at Rezang La, 135 fought to the finish and 5 were taken prisoners, with one lone survivor. Major Shaitan Singh was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra. The Chinese suffered 21 killed and 98 wounded.
- Battle for Gurung Hill: It was held by two companies of 1/8 GR (Strong Points 16, 5 & 6) located northeast at Spanggur Gap. Strong Point 16, the most dominating feature, was at a height of 5,100 m. It was held by a company minus a platoon. The defences were well coordinated and covered by a protective minefield. The position was supported by a troop of AMX 13 light tanks. The task to capture Gurung Hill was assigned to Ali Detachment, the holding formation. A force of eight sections was mustered and duly reinforced by a platoon each of engineers and flame throwers, one heavy machine gun, one 57 mm recoilless gun and twelve 82mm mortars for fire support. One company of 3rd Cavalry was to act as reserve. The intensity of fighting can be gauged from the casualties — 1/8 GR suffered 50 killed and several wounded while the Chinese sustained over 80 (killed and wounded). The PLA could not capture the remaining part of Gurung Hill i.e. Strong Points 5 & 6.
- August 2020: the present: The course of history was set to reverse 58 years later when on August 30, 2020, the Special Frontier Force (SFF) troops secured Kailash Ridge as a pre-emptive operation, taking the PLA by surprise. This action proved a game-changer, neutralising gains made by the Chinese along the northern bank of Pangong Tso and rendering PLA positions east of Spanggur Gap-Maldo Garrison totally vulnerable. Why the PLA did not go for Kailash Ridge initially in May 2020 could be because of (i) first, paucity of infantry as 4 Infantry Division, now motorised, not suited to hold ground, and (ii) second, a presumption that Indian Army will not venture to undertake proactive counteractions.
- Then and now: In 1962, it was on the Kailash Ridge that Indian soldiers proved their mettle and made the PLA pay a heavy price, despite being poorly equipped and ill-prepared. Today, given a rich experience in high altitude-cum-glacial warfare, coupled with vastly improved equipment and infrastructure, the Indian Army is well positioned to hold the Kailash Range for good. The Chinese, on the other hand, are beginning to realise the harsh realities of winters at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Aware of the inability to regain Kailash Ridge with the current force level, and with the window for launching major operations already foreclosed due to the onset of winter, the Chinese may use all ploys to negotiate the Indian Army’s pull-back from south of Pangong Tso. India should be wary of past mistakes and avoid falling into the Chinese trap.
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