UPSC IAS exam preparation - Governance in India - Lecture 15

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Important bodies in India

1.0 Introduction

‘Constitutional Bodies’ in India are the permanent or semi-permanent organizations created by relevant Articles in the Indian Constitution within the machinery of government. These bodies are responsible to look after the administration of specific functions. The functions of these bodies are normally executive in character. Moreover, different types of organisation or commissions are used for advisory functions. The bodies are of national importance and help in the effective function of the government. India is a “Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic” and after independence, the introduction of the independent bodies as a part of the government was intended to help the country achieve these lofty objectives. These constitutional or independent bodies have extensive administrative functions. The chief of these bodies are either appointed by the President of India or the Prime Minister.

2.0 Finance Commission (CONSTITUTIONAL BODY)

Article 280 of the Constitution of India provides for a Finance Commission as a quasi judicial body. It is constituted by the President of India every fifth year or at such earlier time as he considers necessary.

2.1 Composition

The Finance Commission consists of a chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President. They hold office for such period as specified by the President in his order. They are eligible for reappointment.

The Constitution authorises the Parliament to determine the qualifications of members of the Commission and the manner in which they should be selected. Accordingly, the Parliament has specified the qualifications of the chairman and members of the commission. The chairman should be a person having experience in public affairs and the other members should be selected from amongst the following:

A judge of high court or one qualified to be appointed as one
A person who has specialised knowledge of finance and accounts of the government
A person who has wide experience in financial matters and in administration
A person who has special knowledge of economics

2.2 Functions

The Finance Commission is required to make recommendations to the President of India on the following matters:

The distribution of the net proceeds of taxes to be shared between the Centre and the states, and the allocation between the states of the respective shares of such proceeds
The principles that should govern the grants-in-aid to the states by the Centre (i.e., out of the Consolidated Fund of India)
The measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement the resources of the panchayats and the municipalities in the state on the basis of the recommendations made by the State Finance Commission
Any other matter referred to it by the President in the interests of sound finance.

Till 1960, the Commission also suggested the grants given to the states of Assam, Bihar, Odisha and West Bengal in lieu of assignment of any share of the net proceeds in each year of export duty on jute and jute products. These grants were to be given for a temporary period of ten years from the commencement of the Constitution.

The Commission submits its report to the President. He lays it before both the Houses of Parliament along with an explanatory memorandum as to the action taken on its recommendations.

2.3 Advisory role

The recommendations made by the Finance Commission are only of advisory nature and hence, not binding on the government. It is up to the Union government to implement its recommendations.

To put it in other words, ‘it is nowhere laid down in the Constitution that the recommendations of the Commission shall be binding upon the Government of India or that it would give rise to a legal right in favour of the beneficiary states to receive the money recommended to be offered to them by the Commission’.

As rightly observed by Dr. P.V. Rajamannar, the Chairman of the Fourth Finance Commission, ‘since the Finance Commission is a constitutional body expected to be quasi-judicial, its recommendations should not be turned down by the Government of India unless there are very compelling reasons’.

2.4 Commissions appointed

Till now, fourteen Finance Commissions have been constituted. The name of the commission, the years in which they were constituted and submitted their reports, and the name of the respective Chairmen are given above:

2.5 Impact of erstwhile Planning Commission on the Finance Commission

The Constitution of India envisages the Finance Commission as the balancing wheel of fiscal federalism in India. However, its role in the Centre-state fiscal relations has been undermined by the emergence of the Planning Commission, a non-constitutional and a non-statutory body. Dr P V Rajamannar, the Chairman of the Fourth Finance commission, highlighted the overlapping of functions and responsibilities between the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission in federal fiscal transfers in the following ways:

“It is the setting up of the Planning Commission that has in practice restricted the scope and functions of the Finance Commission. I say 'in practice' because there has been no amendment of the Constitution to confine the functions of the Finance Commission to merely ascertain and cover the revenue gap of each state, on a review of the forecast of revenue and expenditure furnished by the state. The reference in Article 275 to grants-in-aid to the revenues of states is not confined to revenue expenditure only. There is no legal warrant for excluding from the scope of the Finance Commission all capital grants; even the capital requirements of a state may be properly met by grants-in-aid under Article 275, made on the recommendations of the Finance Commission.

The legal position, therefore, is that there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the finance commission from taking into consideration both capital and revenue requirements of the states in formulating a scheme of devolution and in recommending grants under Article 275 of the Constitution. But the setting up of Planning Commission inevitably has led to a duplication and overlapping of functions, to avoid which a practice has grown which has resulted in the curtailment of the functions of the finance commission.

As the entire plan, with regard to both policy and programme, comes within the purview of the Planning Commission and as the assistance to be given by the Centre for plan projects either by way of grants or loans is practically dependent on the recommendations of the Planning Commission, it is obvious that a body like the Finance Commission cannot operate in the same field. The main functions of the Finance Commission now consist in determining the revenue gap of each state and providing for filling up the gap by a scheme of devolution, partly by a distribution of taxes and duties and partly by grants-in-aid. We, therefore, recommend that in future the Finance Commission may be asked to make recommendations on the principles which should govern the distribution of plan grants to the states. In order that the Finance Commission may be able to make such recommendations, it will be necessary that it should have before it an outline of the Five Year Plan as prepared by the Planning Commission. The appointment of the Finance Commission will, therefore, have to be so timed that it will have before it this outline before it finalises its recommendations. While the principles governing the distribution of the plan grants will be set out by the Finance Commission, the application of these principles from year to year will be left to the Planning Commission and the Government”.

3.0 National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) (CONSTITUTIONAL BODY)

The National Commission for Scheduled Castes (SCs) is a constitutional body in the sense that it is directly established by Article 338 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the other national commissions like the National Commission for Women (1992), the National Commission for Minorities (1993), the National Commission for Backward Classes (1993), the National Human Rights Commission (1993) and the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (2007) are statutory bodies in the sense that they are established by acts of the Parliament.

3.1 Evolution of the Commission

Originally, Article 338 of the Constitution provided for the appointment of a Special Officer for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) to investigate all matters relating to the constitutional safeguards for the SCs and STs and to report to the President on their working. He was designated as the Commissioner for SCs and STs and assigned the said duty.

In 1978, the Government (through a resolution) set up a non-statutory multi-member Commission for SCs and STs; the Office of Commissioner for SCs and STs also continued to exist. In 1987, the Government (through another resolution) modified the functions of the Commission and renamed it as the National Commission for SCs and STs.

Later, the 65th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1990 provided for the establishment of a high level multi-member National Commission for SCs and STs in the place of a single Special Officer for SCs and STs. This constitutional body replaced the Commissioner for SCs and STs as well as the Commission set up under the Resolution of 1987.

Again, the 89th Constitutional Amendment Act of 20036 bifurcated the combined National Commission for SCs and STs into two separate bodies, namely, National Commission for Scheduled Castes (under Article 338) and National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (under Article 338-A).

The separate National Commission for SCs came into existence in 2004. It consists of a chairperson, a vice-chairperson and three other members. They are appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal. Their conditions of service and tenure of office are also determined by the President.

3.2 Functions of the NCSC

The functions of the Commission are:

To investigate and monitor all matters relating to the constitutional and other legal safeguards for the SCs and to evaluate their working
To enquire into specific complaints with respect to the deprivation of rights and safeguards of the SCs
To participate and advise on the planning process of socio-economic development of the SCs and to evaluate the progress of their development under the Union or a state
To present to the President, annually and at such other times as it may deem fit, reports upon the working of those safeguards
To make recommendations as to the measures that should be taken by the Union or a state for the effective implementation of those safeguards and other measures for the protection, welfare and socio-economic development of the SCs and
To discharge such other functions in relation to the protection, welfare and development and advancement of the SCs as the president may specify.

3.3 Report of the NCSC

The Commission presents an annual report to the President. It can also submit a report as and when it thinks necessary. The President places all such reports before the Parliament, along with a memorandum explaining the action taken on the recommendations made by the Commission. The memorandum should also contain the reasons for the non-acceptance of any of such recommendations. The President also forwards any report of the Commission pertaining to a state government to the state governor. The governor places it before the state legislature, along with a memorandum explaining the action taken on the recommendations of the Commission. The memorandum should also contain the reasons for the non-acceptance of any of such recommendations.

3.4 Powers of the NCSC

The Commission is vested with the power to regulate its own procedure.

The Commission, while investigating any matter or inquiring into any complaint, has all the powers of a civil court trying a suit and in particular, in respect of the following matters:

.summoning and enforcing the attendance of a person from any part of India and examine him on oath
requiring the discovery and production of an document
receiving evidence on affidavits
requisitioning any public record from any court or office
issuing summons for the examination of witnesses and documents and
any other matter which the President may determine.

The Central government and the state governments are required to consult the Commission on all major policy matters affecting the SCs. The Commission is also required to discharge similar functions with regard to the other backward classes (OBCs) and the Anglo-Indian Community as it does with respect to the SCs. In other words, the Commission has to investigate all matters relating to the constitutional and other legal safeguards for the OBCs and the Anglo-Indian Community and report to the President upon their working.

4.0 National Commission for Scheduled tribes (NCST) (CONSTITUTIONAL BODY)

Like the National Commission for Schedules Castes (SCs), the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (STs) is also a constitutional body in the sense that it is directly established by inserting Article 338-A into the Constitution by an amendment to the Artcile 338, through the 89th constitutional amendment done in 2003.

4.1 Separate Commission for STs

The National Commission for SCs and STs came into being consequent upon passing of the 65th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1990. The Commission was established under Article 338 of the Constitution with the objective of monitoring all the safeguards provided for the SCs and STs under the Constitution or other laws.

Geographically and culturally, the STs are different from the SCs and their problems are also different from those of SCs. In 1999, a new Ministry of Tribal Affairs was created to provide a sharp focus to the welfare and development of the STs. It was felt necessary that the Ministry of Tribal Affairs should co-ordinate all activities relating to the STs as it would not be administratively feasible for the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment to perform this role.

Hence, in order to safeguard the interests of the STs more effectively, it was proposed to set up a separate National Commission for STs by bifurcating the existing combined National Commission for SCs and STs. This was done by passing the 89th Constitutional Amendment Act of 2003. This Act further amended Article 338 and inserted a new Article 338-A in the Constitution.

The separate National Commission for STs came into existence in 2004. It consists of a chairperson, a vice-chairperson and three other members. They are appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal. Their conditions of service and tenure

4.2 Functions of the NCST

The functions of the Commission are:

To investigate and monitor all matters relating to the constitutional and other legal safeguards for the STs and to evaluate their working
To inquire into specific complaints with respect to the deprivation of rights and safeguards of the STs
To participate and advise on the planning process of socio-economic development of the STs and to evaluate the progress of their development under the Union or a state
To present to the President, annually and at such other times as it may deem fit, reports upon the working of those safeguards
To make recommendations as to the measures that should be taken by the Union or a state for the effective implementation of those safeguards and other measures for the protection, welfare and socio-economic development of the STs and
To discharge such other functions in relation to the protection, welfare and development and advancement of the STs as the President may specify.

4.3 Other functions of the Commission

In 2005, the President specified the following other functions of the Commission in relation to the protection, welfare and development and advancement of the STs:

Measures to be taken over conferring ownership rights in respect of minor forest produce to STs living in forest areas
Measures to be taken to safeguard rights of the tribal communities over mineral resources, water resources etc., as per law
Measures to be taken for the development of tribals and to work for more viable livelihood strategies
Measures to be taken to improve the efficacy of relief and rehabilitation measures for tribal groups displaced by development projects
Measures to be taken to prevent alienation of tribal people from land and to effectively rehabilitate such people in whose case alienation has already taken place
Measures to be taken to elicit maximum cooperation and involvement of tribal communities for protecting forests and undertaking social afforestation
Measures to be taken to ensure full implementation of the Provisions of Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996
Measures to be taken to reduce and ultimately eliminate the practice of shifting cultivation by tribals that lead to their continuous disem-powerment and degradation of land and the environment

The President places all such reports before the Parliament, along with a memorandum explaining the action taken on the recommendations made by the Commission. The memorandum should also contain the reasons for the non-acceptance of any of such recommendations.

The President also forwards any report of thf Commission pertaining to a state government to th state governor. The governor places it before the state legislature, along with a memorandum explaining the action taken on the recommendations of the Commission. The memorandum should also contain the reasons for the non-acceptance of any of such recommendations.

4.4 Powers of the NCST

The Commission is vested with the power to regulate its own procedure.

The Commission, while investigating any matter or inquiring into any complaint, has all the powers of a civil court trying a suit and in particular in respect of the following matters:

summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from any part of India and examining him on oath
requiring the discovery and production of any document
receiving evidence on affidavits
requisitioning any public record from any court or office
issuing summons for the examination of witnesses and documents and
any other matter which the President may determine.

The Central government and the state governments are required to consult the Commission on all major policy matters affecting the STs.

5.0 Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities (CONSTITUTIONAL BODY)

5.1 Constitutional provisions

Originally, the Constitution of India did not make any provision with respect to the Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities. Later, the States Reorganisation Commission (1953-55) made a recommendation in this regard. Accordingly, the Seventh Constitutional Amendment Act of 1956 inserted a new Article 350-B in Part XVII of the Constitution. This article contains the following provisions:

There should be a Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities. He is to be appointed by the President of India.
It would be the duty of the Special Officer to investigate all matters relating to the safeguards provided for linguistic minorities under the Constitution. He would report to the President upon those matters at such intervals as the President may direct. The President should place all such reports before each House of Parliament and send to the governments of the states concerned.

It must be noted here that the Constitution does not specify the qualifications, tenure, salaries and allowances, service conditions and procedure for removal of the Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities.

5.2 Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities

In pursuance of the provision of Article 350-B of the Constitution, the office of the Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities was created in 1957. He is designated as the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities. The Commissioner has its headquarters at Allahabad (Uttar Pradesh). It has three regional offices at Belgaum (Karnataka), Chennai (Tamil Nadu) and Kolkata (West Bengal). Each is headed by an Assistant Commissioner.

The Commissioner is assisted at the headquarters by a Deputy Commissioner and an Assistant Commissioner. He maintains liaison with the State Governments and Union Territories through nodal officers appointed by them. At the Central level, the Commissioner falls under the Ministry of Minority Affairs. Hence, he submits the annual reports or other reports to the President through the Union Minority Affairs Minister. Presently the office is lying vacant.

5.3 Role

The Commissioner takes up all the matters pertaining to the grievances arising out of the non-implementation of the Constitutional and Nationally Agreed Scheme of Safeguards provided to linguistic minorities that come to its notice or are brought to its knowledge by the linguistic minority individuals, groups, associations or organisations at the highest political and administrative levels of the state governments and UT administrations and recommends remedial actions to be taken.

To promote and preserve linguistic minority groups, the Ministry of Minority Affairs has requested the State Governments / Union Territories to give wide publicity to the constitutional safeguards provided to linguistic minorities and to take necessary administrative measures. The state governments and UT Administrations were urged to accord priority to the implementation of the scheme of safeguards for linguistic minorities. The Commissioner launched a 10 point programme to lend fresh impetus to Governmental efforts towards the preservation of the language and culture of linguistic minorities.

5.4 Vision and Mission

Vision

Streamlining and strengthening implementation machinery and mechanism for effective implementation of the Constitutional safeguards for the Linguistic Minorities, thereby ensuring protection of the rights of speakers of the minority languages so as to provide them equal opportunities for inclusive and integrated development.

Mission

To ensure that all the states / U.T.s effectively implement the Constitutional safeguards and the nationally agreed scheme of safeguards for the linguistic minorities for providing them equal opportunities for inclusive development.

5.5 Functions and Objectives

In more detail, the functions and objectives of the Commissioner are as follows:

Functions

To investigate all matters related to safeguards provided to the linguistic minorities
To submit to the President of India, the reports on the status of implementation of the Constitutional and the nationally agreed safeguards for the linguistic minorities
To monitor the implementation of safeguards through questionnaires, visits, conferences, seminars, meetings, review mechanism, etc

Objectives

To provide equal opportunities to the linguistic minorities for inclusive development and national integration
To spread awareness amongst the linguistic minorities about the safeguards available to them
To ensure effective implementation of the safeguards provided for the linguistic minorities in the Constitution and other safeguards, which are agreed to by the states/U.T.s
To handle the representations for redress of grievances related to the safeguards for linguistic minorities

6.0 COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL OF INDIA (CAG) (CONSTITUTIONAL BODY)

The Constitution of India (Article 148) provides for an independent office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG). He is the head of the Indian Audit and Accounts Department. He is the guardian of the public purse and controls the entire financial system of the country at both the levels - the Centre and the state. His duty is to uphold the Constitution of India and laws of Parliament in the field of financial administration. This is the reason why Dr B R Ambedkar said that the CAG shall be the most important Officer under the Constitution of India. He is one of the bulwarks of the democratic system of government in India; the others being the Supreme Court, the Election Commission and the Union Public Service Commission.

6.1 Appointment and term

The CAG is appointed by the President of India by a warrant under his hand and seal. The CAG, before taking over his office, makes and subscribes before the president an oath or affirmation:

to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India
to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India
to duly and faithfully and to the best of his ability, knowledge and judgement perform the duties of his office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and
to uphold the Constitution and the laws.

He holds office for a period of six years or upto the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier. He can resign any time from his office by addressing the resignation letter to the president. He can also be removed by the president on same grounds and in the same manner as ajudge of the Supreme Court. In other words, he can be removed by the president on the basis of a resolution passed to that effect by both the Houses of Parliament with special majority, either on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.

6.2 Independence

The Constitution has made the following provisions to safeguard and ensure the independence of CAG:

He is provided with the security of tenure. He can be removed by the President only in accordance with the procedure mentioned in the Constitution. Thus, he does not hold his office till the pleasure of the President, though he is appointed by him. (this is an important safeguard)
He is not eligible for further office, either under the Government of India or of any state, after he ceases to hold his office.
His salary and other service conditions are determined by the Parliament. His salary is equal to that of a judge of the Supreme Court.
Neither his salary nor his rights in respect of leave of absence, pension or age of retirement can be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment.
The conditions of service of persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department and the administrative powers of the CAG are prescribed by the president after consultation with the CAG.
The administrative expenses of the office of the CAG, including all salaries, allowances and pensions of persons serving in that office are charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India. Thus, they are not subject to the vote of Parliament.

Further, no minister can represent the CAG in Parliament (both Houses) and no minister can be called upon to take any responsibility for any actions done by him.

6.3 Duties and powers

The Constitution (Article 149) authorises the Parliament to prescribe the duties and powers of the CAG in relation to the accounts of the Union and of the states and of any other authority or body. Accordingly, the Parliament enacted the CAG's (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971. This Act was amended in 1976 to separate accounts from audit in the Central government.

The duties and functions of the CAG as laid down by the Parliament and the Constitution are:

He audits the accounts related to all expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India, consolidated fund of each state and consolidated fund of each union territory having a Legislative Assembly.
He audits all expenditure from the Contingency Fund of India and the Public Account of India as well as the contingency fund of each state and the public account of each state.
He audits all trading, manufacturing, profit and loss accounts, balance sheets and other subsidiary accounts kept by any department of the Central Government and state governments.
He audits the receipts and expenditure of the Centre and each state to satisfy himself that the rules and procedures in that behalf are designed to secure an effective check on the assessment, collection and proper allocation of revenue.
He audits the receipts and expenditure of the following:

All bodies and authorities substantially financed from the Central or state revenues;
Government companies; and
Other corporations and bodies, when so required by related laws.

He audits all transactions of the Central and state governments related to debt, sinking funds, deposits, advances, suspense accounts and remittance business. He also audits receipts, stock accounts and others, with approval of the President, or when required by the President.
He audits the accounts of any other authority when requested by the President or Governor. For example, the audit of local bodies.
He advises the President with regard to prescription of the form in which the accounts of the Centre and the states shall be kept (Article 150).
He submits his audit reports relating to the accounts of the Centre to President, who shall, in turn, place them before both the Houses of Parliament (Article 151).
He submits his audit reports relating to the accounts of a state to governor, who shall, in turn, place them before the state legislature (Article 151).
He ascertains and certifies the net proceeds of any tax or duty (Article 279). His certificate is final. The 'net proceeds' means the proceeds of a tax or a duty minus the cost of collection.
He acts as a guide, friend and philosopher of the Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament.
He compiles and maintains the accounts of state governments. In 1976, he was relieved of his responsibilities with regard to the compilation and maintenance of accounts of the Central Government due to the separation of accounts from audit, that is, departmentalisation of accounts.

The CAG submits three audit reports to the President - (i) audit report on appropriation accounts, (ii) audit report on finance accounts, and (iii) audit report on public undertakings. The President lays these reports before both the Houses of Parliament. After this, the Public Accounts Committee examines them and reports its findings to the Parliament.

The appropriation accounts compare the actual expenditure with the expenditure sanctioned by the Parliament through the Appropriation Act, while the finance accounts show the annual receipts and disbursements of the Union government.

6.4 Role

The role of CAG is to uphold the Constitution of India and the laws of Parliament in the field of financial administration. The accountability of the executive (i.e., council of ministers) to the Parliament in the sphere of financial administation is secured through audit reports of the CAG. The CAG is an agent of the Parliament and conducts audit of expenditure on behalf of the Parliament. Therefore, he is responsible only to the Parliament.

The CAG has more freedom with regard to audit of expenditure than with regard to audit of receipts, stores and stock. Whereas in relation to expenditure he decides the scope of audit and frames his own audit codes and manuals, he has to proceed with the approval of the executive government in relation to rules for the conduct of the other audits.

The CAG has 'to ascertain whether money shown in the accounts as having been disbursed was legally available for and applicable to the service or the purpose to which they have been applied or charged, and whether the expenditure conforms to the authority that governs it'. In addition to this legal and regulatory audit, the CAG can also conduct the propriety audit, that is, he can look into the 'wisdom, faithfulness and economy' of government expenditure and comment on the wastefulness and extravagance of such expenditure. However, unlike the legal and regulatory audit, which is obligatory on the part of the CAG, the propriety audit is discretionary.

The secret service expenditure is a limitation on the auditing role of the CAG. In this regard, the CAG cannot call for particulars of expenditure incurred by the executive agencies, but has to accept a certificate from the competent administrative authority that the expenditure has been so incurred under his authority.

The Constitution of India visualises the CAG to be Comptroller as well as Auditor General. However, in practice, the CAG is fulfilling the role of an Auditor-General only and not that of a Comptroller. In other words, 'the CAG has no control over the issue of money from the consolidated fund and many departments are authorised to draw money by issuing cheques without specific authority from the CAG, who is concerned only at the audit stage when the expenditure has already taken place'. In this respect, the CAG of India differs totally from the CAG of Britain who has powers of both Comptroller as well as Auditor General. In other words, in Britain, the executive can draw money from the public exchequer only with the approval of the CAG.

6.5 CAG and Corporations

The role of CAG in the auditing of public corporations is limited. Broadly speaking, his relationship with the public corporations falls into the following three categories:

Some corporations are audited totally and directly by the CAG. For example, Damodar Valley Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Air India, Indian Airlines Corporation, and others.
Some other corporations are audited by private professional auditors who are appointed by the Central Government in consultation with the CAG. If necessary, the CAG can conduct supplementary audit. The examples are: Central Warehousing Corporation, Industrial Finance Corporation, and others.
Some other corporations are totally subjected to private audit. In other words, their audit is done exclusively by private professional auditors and the CAG does not come into the picture at all. They submit their annual reports and accounts directly to the Parliament. Examples of such corporations are Life Insurance Corporation of India, Reserve Bank of India, State Bank of India, Food Corporation of India, and others.

The role of the CAG in the auditing of Government companies is also limited. They are audited by private auditors who are appointed by the Government on the advise of the CAG. The CAG can also undertake supplementary audit or test audit of such companies.

In 1968, an Audit Board was established as a part of the office of CAG to associate outside specialists and experts to handle the technical aspects of audit of specialised enterprises like engineering, iron and steel, chemicals and so on. This board was established on the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission of India. It consists of a Chairman and two members appointed by the CAG.

6.6 Appleby's criticism

Paul H. Appleby, in his two reports on Indian Administration, was very critical of the role of CAG and attacked the significance of his work. He also suggested that the CAG should be relieved of the responsibility of audit. In other words, he recommended the abolition of the office of CAG. His points of criticism of Indian audit are as follows:

The function of the CAG in India, is in a large measure, an inheritance from the colonial rule.
The CAG is today a primary cause of widespread and paralysing unwillingness to decide and to act. Auditing has a repressive and negative influence.
The Parliament has a greatly exaggerated notion of the importance of auditing to Parliamentary responsibility, and so has failed to define the functions of the CAG as the Constitution contemplated it would do.
The CAG's function is not really a very important one. Auditors do not know and cannot be expected to know very much about good administration.
Auditors know what is auditing, which is not administration; it is a necessary, but a highly pedestrian function with a narrow perspective and a very limited usefulness.
A deputy secretary in the department knows more about the problems in his department than the CAG and his entire staff.

7.0 UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION (UPSC) (CONSTITUTIONAL BODY)

Indianisation of the superior Civil Services became one of the major demands of the political movement compelling the British Indian Government to consider setting up of a Public Service Commission for recruitment to its services in the territory. The first Public Service Commission was set up on October 1st, 1926. However, its limited advisory functions failed to satisfy the people's aspirations and the continued stress on this aspect by the leaders of our freedom movement resulted in the setting up of the Federal Public Service Commission under the Government of India Act 1935. Under this Act, for the first time, provision was also made for the formation of Public Service Commissions at the provincial level.

The Constituent Assembly, after independence, saw the need for giving a secure and autonomous status to Public Service Commissions both at Federal and Provincial levels for ensuring unbiased recruitment to Civil Services as also for protection of service interests. With the promulgation of the new Constitution for independent India on 26th January, 1950, the Federal Public Service Commission was accorded a constitutional status as an autonomous entity and given the title - Union Public Service Commission.

The Union Public Service Commission has been established under Article 315 of the Constitution of India. The Commission consists of a Chairman and ten Members. The terms and conditions of service of Chairman and Members of the Commission are governed by the Union Public Service Commission (Members) Regulations, 1969.

The Commission is serviced by a Secretariat headed by a Secretary with two Additional Secretaries, a number of Joint Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries and other supporting staff.

The Union Public Service Commission have been entrusted with the following duties and role under the Constitution:

Recruitment to services & posts under the Union through conduct of competitive examinations;
Recruitment to services & posts under the Central Government by Selection through Interviews;
Advising on the suitability of officers for appointment on promotion as well as transfer-on-deputation;
Advising the Government on all matters relating to methods of Recruitment to various services and posts;
Disciplinary cases relating to different civil services; and
Miscellaneous matters relating to grant of extra ordinary pensions, reimbursement of legal expenses etc.

The major role played by the Commission is to select persons to man the various Central Civil Services and posts and the services common to the Union and States (viz. All-India Services).

8.0 Attorney General of India (AG) (CONSTITUTIONAL BODY)

Article 76 of the Indian Constitution provides for the office of the Attorney General for India. He is the highest law officer in the country.

8.1 Appointment and term

The Attorney General (AG) is appointed by the president. He must be a person who is qualified to be appointed a judge of the Supreme Court.

The term of office of the AG is not fixed by the Constitution. Further, the Constitution does not contain the procedure and grounds for his removal. He holds office during the pleasure of the president. This means that he may be removed by the president at any time. He may also quit his office by submitting his resignation to the president. Conventionally, he resigns when the government (council of ministers) resigns or is replaced, as he is appointed on its advice.

The remuneration of the AG is not fixed by the Constitution. He receives such remuneration as the president may determine.

8.2 Duties and functions

As the chief law officer of the Government of India, the duties of the AG include the following:

To give advice to the Government of India upon such legal matters, which are referred to him by the president.
To perform such other duties of a legal character that are assigned to him by the president.
To discharge the functions conferred on him by the Constitution or any other law.

The president has assigned the following duties to the AG:

To appear on behalf of the Government of India in all cases in the Supreme Court in which the Government of India is concerned.
To represent the Government of India in any reference made by the president to the Supreme Court under Article 143 of the Constitution.
To appear (when required by the Government of India) in any high court in any case in which the Government of India is concerned.

8.3 Rights and limitations

In the performance of his official duties, the Attorney General has the right of audience in all courts in the territory of India. Further, he has the right to speak and to take part in the proceedings of both the Houses of Parliament or their joint sitting and any committee of the Parliament of which he may be named a member, but without a right to vote. He enjoys all the privileges and immunities that are available to a member of Parliament.

Following limitations are placed on the Attorney General in order to avoid any complication and conflict of duty

He should not advise or hold a brief against the Government of India.
He should not advise or hold a brief in cases in which he is called upon to advise or appear for the Government of India.
He should not defend accused persons in criminal prosecutions without the permission of the Government of India.
He should not accept appointment as a director in any company or corporation without the permission of the Government of India.

However, the Attorney General is not a full-time counsel for the Government. He does not fall in the category of government servants. Further, he is not debarred from private legal practice.

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