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CONCEPT – THE CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN INDIA
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- Civil – Military relationship in India: The military leadership has always been unhappy at the ‘imbalance’ in the decision-making structure at the highest levels but has been unable to change the system. The civil-military relationship in the country post-1947 is full of episodes that suggest a constant state of tension between the ‘generalist’ bureaucracy and the ‘specialist’ military leaders, with the political executive watching and sometimes encouraging the bureaucracy to keep the military under control.
- From the 1950s itself: The political executive, starting with India’s first PM Nehru, generally excluded the military leadership from the decision-making process at the highest levels. Some feel that by selective usage, omission and interpretation of language, it (civil services) has continuously imposed a variety of constraints, checks and curbs on the very functioning of the armed forces in general, and the business of service headquarters in particular. This has virtually isolated and marginalised the defence forces from all processes which go into the formulation of national policies and agendas, even in the cardinal sphere of national security.
- New structures needed since 1950s: Independence also necessitated creation of structures to establish parliamentary control over the military.
- In 1947, a committee of three senior Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers had suggested structuring of the MoD on the lines of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and, in the process, had also aimed at lowering the standing of the military officers like that of the police officers in relation to the ICS.
- It was Lord Mountbatten who ensured that the Services Chiefs retained a status higher than that of the Defence Secretary. Mountbatten’s Chief of Staff Lord Ismay, not wanting to rock the boat in those turbulent times, suggested the formation of a high-level committee to look after Services matters instead of ordering a radical restructuring.
- Today, the political-military interface is all but absent in India’s institutional set-up. The armed forces are completely under the day-to-day as well as policy control of the MoD. The desirable politico-military interface is now reduced to weekly, sometimes fortnightly, meetings chaired by the Defence Minister.
- Story through the 1970s, 80s and 90s: Through the Seventies, Eighties and Nineties, the bureaucracy continued to acquire disproportionate powers vis-à-vis the Services Chiefs and now it’s a given that the Defence Secretary and NOT the Services Chiefs, comprises the single-point adviser to the Cabinet on matters military. For he and the Cabinet Secretary have a consistent interface with the political leadership, with the Services Chiefs attending the meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) only if invited.
- ToB Rules 1961: The bureaucracy points to the “Government of India Transaction of Business Rules” (ToB Rules). Framed in 1961, under the constitutional powers of the President of India, these documents continue to guide the conduct of business by the Government of India.
- Under these rules, the three Services Headquarters were designated as “Attached Offices of the Department of Defence”, and, therefore, placed in a position subordinate to the Department of Defence (DoD).
- The Services Chiefs, as professional heads of the three armed forces and with experience garnered over a period of at least four decades, found no mention in these rules.
- The Secretary, Department of Defence, on the other hand, according to these rules, is responsible for Defence of India and every part thereof.
- Imbalance is bad, hence rectification: Having identified the problem of acute imbalance in powers, the GoM, led by then Deputy Prime Minister LK Advani made many far-reaching recommendations. Some key points were:
- Creation of the post of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), whose tasks were to include inter-Services prioritisation of defence plans and improvement in synergy among the three Services
- Creation of Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS)
- Formation of a tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar Command and a Strategic Forces Command
- Establishment of the tri-Service Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- Creation of the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) for gathering electronic and other technical intelligence
- Another task force: Another task force recommended
- Appointment of a Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC)
- Integration of the Services HQ and Ministry of Defence by allowing more cross-postings
- Shifting the focus of India’s national security strategy from Pakistan to China
- Better intelligence coordination among all the agencies
- Creation of a dedicated financial institution for access to energy, rare earths and raw materials from across the world
- Post Kargil War, based on the various committee reports, in spite of adopting the term Integrated HQ of Ministry of Defence (MOD), the fact is that the three Services do not form part of the MoD’s organisational chart and continue to be attached HQs based on the Allocation of Business (AOB)/Transaction of Business (TOB) Rules 1961. This has brought bureaucratic control over the military (not political control). The services have to become a department of the MoD.
An inclusive structure would be like this -
- The proposed recommendation envisages an Integrated Armed Forces HQ under a CDS/PCOSC, with four Integrated Force HQ, an Integrated Force Command, and two Integrated Functional Commands. Each of the Force HQ would be responsible for conduct of operations in respective theatres, while the Functional Commands for providing integrated combat and logistics support to the armed forces.
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