All for one, one for all?

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All for one, one for all?

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• Creation of Integrated Theatre Commands: The suggestion to do so has met with some resistance, mostly from the Indian Air Force, as it claims that its limited resources will render effective application of air power difficult.
• The two needed together: Indeed, if we go for integrated commands, we must also go for meaningful restructuring in higher defence organisation of India. One without the other is useless. And first of all will come the integration of MoD (Ministry of Defence) and appointment of CDS (Chief of Defence Staff).
• Why do so? The above will bring cohesion in the three services and maybe lead to integrated organisations in the future.
• Expected nature of future wars: The Air Force officers feel that wars may be swift, lasting just a few days or weeks. But the Army and the Navy may not agree with the mechanics of how this may unfold, and have their own views. So first, we must build a common vision on nature of future wars.
• Definition by Carl von Clausewitz: Nature of war remains the same - violent character, clash of wills, political primacy. Character of war changes over time - how it will be fought, the military capabilities, various economy / technology / political considerations, and the opponent's aim and strategy.
• Political purpose decisive: It decides the start and end of war, as also the manner of fighting. Indian services' plan is based on proactive action called "Cold Start" where maximum combat power is to be quickly applied in a series of strikes.
• Few examples: When did the Indian state use military force? 

1. Kargil conflict, 1999: Pak army committed an act of war by taking up positions on Indian side of LoC. The complete military was ready to strike Pakistan by land, sea and air, but the government decided to restrict it to just Kargil, and that  too our side of LoC. We still won. 
2. Indian Parliament attacks, 13 Dec, 2001: The Indian Army mobilised under "Operation Parakram" and remained deployed  along the borders for almost an year. Then came Kaluchak attack killing 34 (soldiers and family) but nothing happened. Army returned to its barracks in December 2002, clearly showing lack of political will. 
3. Mumbai attack 2008: Military options were discussed. But then the political leadership realise that "there was more to be gained by not attacking Pakistan, than by attacking it“.

• The real use of Military: Its size does not matter, per se. Has the massive American military realised the political goals in Afghanistan? No. So, what matters is that a military must be able to achieve the national aims.
• Future wars between nuclear adversaries: How will victory be defined if it is fought without using the nuclear weapons? If our Army enters Pakistani Punjab, will only their Army retaliate, or will all terror groups, criminals, and civilians also join in?
• How will China fight? Will it apply force massively across the Himalayan watershed, or will it use its lead in IT, cyber warfare and ballistic missile technology? Will it fire missiles into population centres?
• All sit together: It's important that all three services discuss all options together, right from non-contact warfare to full-scale war. Once we arrive at that understanding on nature of future wars, then we can arrive at the best joint structure for Indian military to fight those wars. Each service talking about itself is not the best way forward.   CONCEPT
• Summary: Indian forces need a clear discussion on the nature of future wars, and evolve a joint structure that matches those anticipations.

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