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America in Afghanistan - Soviet experience redux
Read more on - Polity | Economy | Schemes | S&T | Environment
- US in Afghanistan: Experts are painting a bleak picture of what will happen to Afghanistan if the United States withdraws its remaining 2,500 troops prematurely. Experts feel that transnational terrorist groups will rebuild capabilities that were destroyed following the U.S.-led invasion and be operational again to attack U.S. soil within two to three years.
- Doha Peace agreement: Under the strange 2020 Doha agreement, the Trump administration promised to remove all U.S. troops in return for the Taliban’s "pledge" to enter into meaningful peace talks with the Afghan government, but without any promises by the Taliban to cease violence. Pakistan played a pivotal role in the Doha deal, and the Afghan government was left out entirely from the discussions! The deal required the Taliban to ensure Afghanistan would not be used by al Qaeda or other terrorist groups to target the United States or its allies.
- What Taliban did: The Taliban flagrantly disregarded these conditions. They have not ended ties with al Qaeda. Violent attacks are on the rise in Afghanistan, with an increase in targeted killings of government and military officials, and also journalists and civil-society activists. Almost two decades after the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban are stronger than they have ever been since their overthrow in December 2001.
- 1990s back again: So there is a real concern that Afghanistan could revert back into the breeding ground for extremism that it was in the 1990s. Much will depend on the next steps the Biden administration takes in 2021. Withdrawing U.S. forces too soon could trigger civil war, hand the Taliban victory, and spur the reemergence of terrorist groups that could threaten the West.
- Lessons from 1980s: The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 offers important lessons—and warnings—for the United States. Although the present conflict with the Taliban has lacked the bitter intensity of the Soviet occupation, it has lingered far longer. And although the scale is different, understanding the experiences of the Soviet Union leaving Afghanistan, and the withdrawal’s aftermath, provides important lessons on exit strategies for the United States. U.S. and Soviet challenges and uncertainties bear a striking resemblance on several levels: the question of how quickly foreign forces can exit Afghanistan without undercutting security, the ability and capacity of Afghan forces to protect the population, and the perseverance and functional ability of the Afghan government once the foreign troops are gone.
- Geneva accords: The Soviet withdrawal was formalized as part of the 1988 Geneva Accords between Afghanistan and Pakistan, undersigned by the United States and Soviet Union. Although Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty, Moscow had difficulty enforcing Islamabad’s cooperation—just like Washington would witness post-9/11. In 1989, Soviet leaders discussed Pakistan’s problematic role: “Pakistani border troops are actively participating in military operations on Afghan territory,” a Politburo official had said. Soviet leaders understood that the years following their withdrawal would determine Afghanistan’s future and define the legacy of their intervention.
- The rise of Taliban: Between 1989 and 1991, Moscow supplied the Afghans with significant financial backing earmarked for capacity-building efforts along with a vast array of weaponry, some of which were used in the struggle against the mujahedeen, an Afghan-Arab amalgamation of Islamist fighters supported by the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia with the goal of driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan. It was from within these groups that the Taliban later emerged.
- Loya Jirga: Much like post-9/11 Afghanistan under former President Hamid Karzai, then-President Mohammad Najibullah also reinstated the Loya Jirga, a traditional council of Afghan political leaders, tribal elders, and religious figures. Its decisions — based on consensus — are seen as final and binding. The decaying Soviet Union provided financial and military support to Najibullah’s government for three years. It was only after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 that support from Moscow dwindled and Najibullah’s government fell apart. In 1992, the mujahedeen captured Kabul. This was seen as a victory for the United States, since the Soviet-supported Najibullah was seen to have been on the wrong side of the Cold War.
- Dark phase: Competing interests among Afghanistan’s ethnic groups—mainly the Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Uzbeks—soon grew, and they began to carve up Afghan territory among themselves while simultaneously trying to take power from one another. Major cities, including Kabul, were reduced to rubble. The Taliban strategy in seeking to kill Afghan politicians and anyone who questions their agenda has continued unabated. A Pashtun cleric, Mullah Mohammad Omar, emerged as the leader of the Taliban, militants trained in Pakistani madrasas that preached violent jihad. In 1996, they publicly castrated and hung Najibullah in Kabul. By 2001, they controlled around 90 percent of the country. Their brutal five-year regime represents one of the darkest times in Afghanistan’s history.
- Summary: History is almost about to repeat itself in Afghanistan, if the US withdraws urgently.
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