India has some tough choices to make regarding Afghanistan now.
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The Afghanistan tangle for India
- The story: The sudden fall of Afghanistan is a shock for Indian foreign policy, that did not expect President Ghani to abandon so quickly. He did.
- The near shock: The challenge is a potential, massive humanitarian crisis on account of the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced who have left other war zones and taken shelter on pavements and parks in Kabul. Then there is the panic and rush for passports and visas for those who fear for their lives from the Taliban. India will be expected to offer emergency visas and evacuation of those close to India who will be under threat. The worst hit would be Afghan women and youth who tasted political, civic, economic and human rights and opportunities, and media freedoms. It's all gone in a moment.
- Why did the Army collapse: The near-total capitulation of the 300,000-350,000 US and NATO trained and equipped Afghan Army and Police forces, the ANDSF, collapsed without a fight. Few honourable exceptions were in Lashkargah, Herat and Taloqan. What can explain the US decision to pull out its troops unconditionally without waiting for a negotiated political settlement regardless of consequences that were almost entirely predictable other than the speed with which it occurred? What explains India’s reluctance to engage the Taliban and what can it do now?
- Elections undermined: Now it is clear that the undermining of the September 2019 elections by the Zalmay Khalilzad-led US peace process while trying to force a ‘transitional government’ as part of the US-Taliban ‘deal’ was a bad idea. An increasingly discredited Ghani government were part of the problem, as was mismanagement of appointments in key security ministries, especially the Ministry of Defence.
- Technical dependence: The Afghan Army was unprepared and caught by surprise by the Taliban offensive. Technical dependence on the US for air support, weapon systems, intelligence etc, psychological denial that they would indeed leave as they warned, a lack of military strategy, poor supplies and logistics, indefensible and thinly manned posts, unpaid salaries, phantom rolls, and a sense of betrayal, abandonment and demoralisation, all played a role in this.
- What kind of army: The Afghan National Army was never really trained and equipped with the normal attributes of a national army capable of defending territory with adequate mobility, artillery, armour, engineering, logistics, intelligence, air support etc for rugged terrain; and infantry battalions and doctrines designed for it. On the contrary, most of the effort went into grooming Special Forces units meant to recover targets of urban terrorist attacks, at which they acquitted themselves admirably, but not offensive operations.
- US lost interest: After the end of the Soviet intervention and the fall of the Soviet Union, the US has never really considered Afghanistan of strategic importance. For all its $1 trillion investment in Afghanistan and its awareness of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, the US never really invested in the Afghan economy or attempt to integrate it to its economic sphere of influence (including India) as it did after its interventions after World War II in Europe, East Asia and later in the oil economies of the Gulf.
- Best years: Despite western attempts to portray the Afghan ‘democracy’ that came in its wake as a failure, the 20 years since the ouster of the Taliban, for all its flaws, have arguably been one of the most promising periods in Afghanistan’s recent history in terms of education and capacity building in which India too played a major part. This was the one period when there was a net return of refugees and expatriates, not outflow of refugees that has now begun.
- A dark thought: Is the US using the Taliban whose return it has legitimised and facilitated through the US-Taliban deal and its withdrawal, to destabilise the region to keep China, Russia, Iran, and possibly even Pakistan off balance with Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics and India as collateral damage?
- Indian case: What should India do under the circumstances? India may like to keep an open mind, wait and watch what the Taliban actually do during and after the transitional process, assess how inclusive they are in accommodating the gains of the last 20 years and the progressive principles of the Islamic Republic. India has to move very cautiously, as China is deeply engaged now.
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