America's Afghanistan pullout can mean a pivot to Indo-Pacific

Evolving dynamics of power with America and China in focus

 America's Afghanistan pullout can mean a pivot to Indo-Pacific

---

• The story: The catastrophic endgame in Afghanistan after the American withdrawal raised concerns in many East Asian capitals. They do not see the turmoil as an event that marks a major shift in U.S. foreign policy.
• Started with Obama: It was the Obamaa administration that decided on the withdrawal as part of a broader pullback from the greater Middle East, the Trump administration negotiated with the Taliban to set conditions, and the Biden administration only implemented what everyone already knew to be U.S. policy.

1. Asian countries are watching closely to see whether and how the end of military involvement in Afghanistan will affect U.S. President Joe Biden’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region.
2. China’s regional neighbors have applauded Biden’s diplomacy—not because he is doing anything fundamentally new but because he is continuing the Trump administration’s policies in the Indo-Pacific, just as he did in Afghanistan.
3. Biden, like his predecessor, has defined China as a strategic competitor and emphasized his determination to meet the challenge posed by Beijing.

• Biden's approach: Indo-Pacific The Biden administration has been attempting to build on its predecessor’s policies by constructing a multilateral framework to deal with China. In February 2021, Biden held the first-ever summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as the Quad), the Indo-Pacific forum comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Since April, Biden has met with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and South Korean President Moon Jae-in and confirmed they will work together in their response to China, emphasizing in their joint documents the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

1. This is deterrence by words. The purpose is to send a strong and clear message through summit meetings and joint documents that it is unacceptable for China to unilaterally upend the current global order and to call on Beijing for restraint.
2. The Chinese government has pushed back strongly against such calls, but the latest round of diplomacy seems to have had some effect in deterring Beijing’s assertiveness.

• Taiwan Strait: Since Japan and the United States signed their joint statement on April 16, provocations by Chinese military aircraft toward Taiwan have declined significantly. 248 Chinese fighter or bomber aircraft entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone on a total of 70 days between Jan. 7 and April 16. Between April 17 and July 25, such incursions took place on 30 percent fewer days and involved 55 percent fewer aircraft. China’s intention is unclear, but as the United States and Japan draw closer together and signal their willingness to cooperate on the Taiwan Strait, China may be reconsidering whether it is a good idea to escalate military provocation at this time.
• An advantage against China: What makes it tricky is that the risk tolerance in relations with China varies greatly from country to country. The countries with the highest risk tolerance—and thus the greatest willingness to stand up to China—are Japan and Australia. Both are long-standing allies of the United States, which has a treaty obligation for their defense. Approximately 55,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan provide the country with a security umbrella. It also helps that both Japan and Australia are geographically separated from China by sea. Conversely, the countries of mainland Southeast Asia, geographically close to China and highly dependent on the Chinese economy, have a much lower risk tolerance. Laos and Myanmar, which share land borders with China, and Cambodia, which is also close to China, typically seek to avoid antagonizing their big neighbor.

1. The higher the tension between Washington and Beijing, the more likely it will be that countries with less risk tolerance fear being caught in the middle, take a neutral position, and avoid supporting the United States.
2. Beijing knows this, of course, and will continue to paint Washington as the interloper increasing military tension in the region.

• Goals: The U.S. Indo-Pacific policy must aim for two medium-term goals. The first is to rebuild the trade system and reintegrate the United States so that Indo-Pacific countries can gradually reduce their economic dependence on China. Second, the United States must work with its partners to prevent the military balance in Asia from leaning further toward Chinese dominance.
• Military angle: On the military side, U.S. strategy seems more straightforward. The Biden administration is trying to shift resources to the Indo-Pacific to deal with China’s military expansion. The U.S. military is conducting reconnaissance activities and exercises in the Indo-Pacific at roughly the same pace as during the Trump era. However, these efforts alone are not sufficient to maintain a stable military balance in the region. China’s massive expansion of its defense capabilities has upended U.S. military superiority in Asia. China has about five times as many fighter jets deployed in the Indo-Pacific as the United States. That is projected to rise to eightfold by 2025.
• Summary: In September 2013, then-President Barack Obama declared that the United States would no longer play the role of world policeman. Eight years have passed since then, and Obama’s remarks seem to be turning into reality—as the world just witnessed with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. What’s missing are concrete measures for the United States and its allies to establish a new division of responsibility and maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Join PT courses | PT Youtube | PT App | Contribute |  Testimonials